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Abstract The role of urban design in urban policy making has been extensively discussed in
recent years due to the insufficiency of existing applications in the complex structure of
global urbanization. This paper aims at addressing the role of urban design as a policy
instrument in urban politics through a case in one of the metropolitan cities of Turkey, Bursa.
The case presented in the article reflects the emergence of a non-space in a city with a rich
historic and cultural heritage. Lack of control and accountability, lack of communication
between actors in the process and power coalitions are the main reasons of this process that
caused the huge misfit between TOKI Doganbey settlement and the overall context. This
settlement harmed Bursa’s identity tremendously and caused a lot of turmoil since none of
the parties involved is content with the end product. We try to elaborate on the process and
the role of various actors in shaping it. Turkey does not have a rich urban design experience
although successful projects are seen in high-income housing settlements. We conclude that
it is timely to start with a new approach to the discipline to prevent such failures with large
impacts on the urban form and life. The need for a holistic approach seems imperative to
establish the core of a new urban design discipline involving socio-spatial concerns.
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This paper aims at addressing the role of urban design as a policy instrument through a case
in one of the metropolitan cities of Turkey, Bursa. Currently, a major industrial center,
Bursa has a rich history particularly due to its role as the capital city of the Ottoman
Empire in the fourteenth century. The city’s legacy as a historic and religious center
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rich public architecture of the city, mostly characterized by mosques, külliyes, khans and
cemeteries. Traditional forms of retail spaces and housing settlements are main compo-
nents of Bursa’s urban identity. The buildings from the republican period in the first half of
the twentieth century also display architectural identity reflecting their period.1 Despite
changes in recent years, the city protected its dominant architectural patterns, most of
which were recognized as UNESCO world heritage sites.
The major topic of the paper is the renewal of a particular district within such a
historical city embodying architectural richness. The case that will be discussed below
concerns Doğanbey District, a run-down quarter with a central location quite close to the
historic core. The area was dominated by old houses and industry, and with the involve-
ment of the Mass Housing Administration (TOKI), it was subject to a swift process of slum
clearance and the construction of new housing units. Nevertheless, the striking outcome
was disastrous in terms of urban quality: 23 densely located blocks with 23-floor height
now rise in downtown Bursa, dominating the skyline (Fig. 1).
Today, the Doğanbey renewal project is regarded as one of the biggest failures by
almost all parties including the government officials responsible for its realization. Our
intention in this paper is to scrutinize this case of failure with regard to the role of urban
design. The renewal process involved various public and private actors as TOKI works
with local contractors to build the houses. Within this framework, planning regulations,
government intervention and power relations, the level of opposition and consent are key
topics to be discussed in order to understand the true nature of the resulting product, a
settlement that is completely inconsistent with the overall spatial quality of the historical
city. To understand the nature of the process that resulted in such an architectural and
spatial failure, we ask the following questions: ‘‘What are the existing mechanisms of
planning that make such non-place possible?’’ ‘‘Is there a missing link between planning
and architecture and if so, what are the mechanisms that help to make the process
healthier?’’ ‘‘Can urban design be defined as one of the links needed? Could it provide an
effective frame of reference for a successful negotiation process?’’
1 The renewal of Bursa Doğanbey District
Urbanization in Turkey has followed a pattern similar to the developing nations of the
Third World in the postwar era. It comprised clientelist policies subsuming the immigrant
populations into the urban realm. This pattern later gave way to a second phase across the
globe, which depended on ‘‘new entrepreneurialism’’ seeking participatory governance
methods. The peculiar form of this phase in Turkey rested on amnesties legalizing squatter
areas surrounding the major cities (Eraydın and Taşan-Kok 2014). Local improvement
plans allowing building heights up to 4–5 floors not only transformed the physical textures
of the Turkish cities but also turned squatters into landlords and developers undertaking the
redevelopment of their neighborhoods. While the increasing dominance of local
improvement plans represented the decline of comprehensive planning in Turkey, they also
created a sort of ‘‘entrepreneurial subjectivity’’ transforming the squatters as urban political
actors.2 The fragmentary development of Turkish cities disregarding macro-decisions
opened up the path to the deployment of urban design projects as a means of urban growth
1 For architectural identity in Bursa, see Birlik (2011).
2 Karaman (2014) uses the term in reference to the current urban regeneration projects in Turkey, but this
particular form of subjectivity has its roots in the 1980s.
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in the following decade. As we will discuss shortly, both this method and this particular
form of subjectivity were important in the regeneration of Doğanbey.
Continuous population growth was inevitably coupled by the constant need for housing
production. TOKI was established in 1984 to this end, with the objective of providing low-
income citizens with proper housing to remove squatter settlements. The administration
initially funded housing cooperatives, which resulted in the use of its resources to support
middle-class housing rather than the urban poor (Tekeli 1996). In 2003, TOKI was granted
new powers. Accordingly, it was allowed to establish companies, execute projects to create
new funds, and use public land without charge. In 2004, it was granted planning authority
in the regeneration sites and the power to determine the value of expropriation in squatter
areas. In 2007, the duties of the Ministry of Public Works regarding slum clearance were
also transferred to TOKI. With these regulations, the administration became exempt from
almost all of the bureaucratic mechanisms and could freely expropriate, plan and redevelop
areas. Moreover, it became the major actor in housing production and the main facilitator
of public private partnership. In inner city areas, TOKI undertakes the appropriation of
multi-parceled land without legal obstacles or popular resistance and creates an invest-
ment-friendly environment. Land is appropriated under its market value, which provides
enormous advantages for the developers in reducing costs. Using its administrative power
to evaluate land lower than the market price, TOKI acts as a monopoly and mobilizes
public–private partnerships (Rawlins 2013).3
Fig. 1 TOKI Doğanbey high-rises dominating Bursa’s skyline (Source: http://konuttimes.com/toki/toki-
bursagursu-basvuru-donemi-bugun-basladi/72815)
3 As a result, the number of houses constructed by TOKI between 2003 and 2016 reached 700 000, while
this number was merely 43,000 for the period 1984–2003 (TOKI 2011a, b, 2016). The figure given by TOKI
includes apartments currently under construction; the number of houses actually delivered to their owners is
588 221 (TOKI 2016).
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If we turn to Bursa within this framework, currently the fourth largest city of
Turkey, it has always been an important settlement throughout history with its location
on the Silk Road. Settled at the foot of Mt Uludağ (the Mysian Olympus) and over-
looking the fertile Bursa Plain on the north, the city was famous for silk production
during the Ottoman Empire and evolved into a commercial center for textiles. It was
also one of the earliest industrial centers that emerged in Anatolia in the nineteenth
century (Kaygalak 2008). Hence, it was also promoted by the republican elite seeking
modernization and industrialization after the foundation of the nation state in 1923.
Similar to other major cities, Bursa experienced rural-to-urban migration in the postwar
era; moreover, what was peculiar to Bursa was international migration particularly
from Bulgaria which continued well into the 1990s.4 While the city expanded to the
west with middle- and high-income residential areas, the low-income newcomers set-
tled at the eastern edges.
The urban sprawl, particularly the relocation of middle- and high-income groups in the
newly developing residential areas in western Bursa, led to the decline of various inner city
quarters previously occupied by residential and/or small-scale production functions. A
research comparing eight cities in Turkey found out that Bursa has the highest demand for
housing in the city center which makes production here more attractive for private com-
panies (Türel 2011). The share of private companies in total housing production in Bursa is
above 90%, and the growth rate of housing prices in Bursa is one of the highest in Turkey
(TOKI 2011b).
The revitalization of the center was a strategic issue for Bursa, since tourism was
conceived as an important sector. The city was selected among others for the City
Branding project in 2009 as a part of tourism strategies by the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism.5 Local power groups seem to have a consensus on the components of the new
city brand involving the rich history of Bursa to create a potential for culture tourism.6
International organizations also have an agenda for sustainable development in Bursa
among other Turkish cities (World Bank 2015). Thus, the prospect for urban transfor-
mation in Bursa has been a hot topic.
Within this context, the area under discussion, which was later labeled as Doğanbey
Urban Renewal Zone, included the four neighborhoods of Doğanbey, Tayakadın, Kiremitçi
and Kırcaali and covered 180,000 square meters of very valuable land at the heart of Bursa
(Fig. 2). The area contained 1–2 floor detached buildings in poor conditions. There were
about 1250 dwellings aged between 70 and 80 (TOKI 2011b). The proximity of the area to
the historic core of Bursa led to its designation as a new CBD in 1993. According to the
development and land-use plans, the commercial functions within the historic center would
expand to this area relieving the pressure on the historic zone and allow it to obtain a
touristic character. However, although the perimeter of the area facing the major thor-
oughfares developed into commercial strips, the interior further degraded into slums.7 To
the dismay of the development plans that foresaw the transformation of individual lots with
building permits for 4–5 floors, contractors did not find it profitable to undertake con-
struction in the area.
4 For a historical account of Bursa’s urban development, see Karakurt Tosun (2007: 106–126).
5 For the City Branding Project, see Gündoğdu (2014).
6 For Bursa’s urban identity as perceived by its citizens, see Taşkın and Tuncel (2011). For urban coalitions
in Bursa, see Tunç (2011).
7 For a detailed account see, Uyan (2008: 150–155).
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With the emergence of a new urban renewal paradigm empowering TOKI and the
municipalities, Osmangazi Municipality, which operates in the central part of the city
containing the historical core, took initiative. Although the municipality lacked authority
and know-how to implement a renewal project, the mayor effectively mobilized local
power groups (organized in the chambers of commerce and industry) and was successful in
gaining the support of one of the ministers who was elected to the parliament as Bursa
representative. With the involvement of Minister Çelik, TOKI came into the picture. The
district municipality signed a protocol with TOKI in early 2006 (Uyan 2008). By the end of
the year, Bursa Greater Municipality also became a stakeholder in the protocol, since urban
renewal powers were granted to the greater municipalities. The greater municipality
transferred its authority to the district municipality via this protocol. Since it is not com-
mon to see a greater municipality giving up its authority in urban renewal (which is
extremely profitable within the existing legal framework), this is a proof of the power of
the urban coalition mobilized by the mayor of Osmangazi District. The district munici-
pality acquired the service of a consultancy firm (Öncü Mimarlık) in producing the
analyses regarding ownership pattern in the area. These analyses revealed that there were
4300 shareholders on 1000 houses and 98% of these consented to the project (Osmangazi
Municipality 2008). With the consent of the majority and the expropriation of the
remaining lots, evacuation of the area and the demolition of existing buildings started in
2007. Table 1 shows the stages of the process, which represents the typical method
deployed by TOKI. The significant aspect of the process is the minor role given to par-
ticipation, which is understood merely as informing the inhabitants. The major actors are
defined as TOKI and the municipality, and these two actors define the terms of agreement
for the part of the inhabitants without any deliberation with them. The inhabitants are
informed after the preparation of 1/1000 urban design blueprints, that is, the residents do
not have a say in either the terms of agreements or the physical design of the housing
environment. It is also crucial to note that urban design is understood as the physical layout
representing the land-use organization based on the economic model.
Initially, Öncü Mimarlık was authorized to achieve the concept design for which a
private urban design firm (Tektonika) was hired. The preliminary proposal dated February
2007 contained variety of building types and unit sizes (Table 2). Although the initial idea
was to provide an apartment for each shareholder, the divergence between the numbers of
existing houses and that of the shareholders led to the definition of a benchmark limit to be
Fig. 2 Doğanbey urban renewal zone before the process (Source: TOKI 2011c, p. 119)
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Table 1 Pre-construction stages of urban renewal in Doğanbey, Bursa
Project stage Explanation
Initial decision Definition of the financial model and establishment of collaboration with TOKI
Legalization of the initial
decision
Designation of the area as an urban renewal zone by the Municipal Assembly
Signing the agreement Protocol between municipality and TOKI
Analyses Study and documentation of ownership pattern in the project area
Economic model Study of maximum floor area to be built, definition of apartment sizes, contents
of the individual contracts
Value assessment Evaluation of the assets in the project area
Approval of value
assessment
TOKI approves value assessment studies
Hypothetical urban
design scheme
Delineation of physical sizes (built area) derived from the economic model
Urban design proposal 1/1000 blueprints indicating massing
Preparation of contracts Preparation of individual contracts to be signed by the shareholders
Agreement with
shareholders
Acquiring the approval of the shareholders
Municipal approval
(contracts)
Municipal Assembly approves details of contracts
Municipal approval
(masterplan)
Municipal Assembly approves 1/5000 masterplan
Bids for urban design
project
Bids for 1/1000 revision plan and the urban design proposal
Municipal approval
(1/1000 plan)
Municipal Assembly approves 1/1000 revision plan




Produced from TOKI (2011b: 113)
Table 2 Building types and unit sizes in various proposals for Doğanbey Renewal Project
February 2007 Late 2007 February 2008 April 2008 (final)
75 m2 880 840 898 1147
112 m2 807 683 666 624
150 m2 880 884 932 976
Total number of units 2567 2407 2496 2747
Low-rises courtyard
type (3–4 floor)
550 units 498 units 430 units 430 units













Produced from Nalbant (2011)
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eligible for a house in the project and equivalence between the existing shares and the
future ones (75-m2 apartment for 50-m2 plot share). Determined to organize a renewal
process keeping the residents in the area, the consultants proposed to entitle each resident
holding a share of 5 m2 to own a house with a mortgage to be paid in 10–12 years
(interview with consultants in Öncü Mimarlık, 07.12.2016). After calculations based on the
negotiations with the shareholders (more than half owned shares smaller than 50 m2), 2400
units were allocated to the shareholders (TOKI 2011b), that is, nearly half of the share-
holders either chose to leave the project area not being able to afford the proposed loans or
signed agreements jointly. The apartments were promised to be finished in 18 months, and
the shareholders were to be provided with rent aid during the construction period. TOKI
was to own a commercial lot of 15,000 m2 allocated for a shopping mall as well as a
number of apartments. The district municipality and Bursa Commodity Exchange were
also given shares in the project.8
The design proposal displayed concern for the heights of surrounding buildings (Fig. 3).
While high rises were situated closer to the commercial center and its busy streets with
already high buildings, residential quarters with lower building heights were faced with
low-rise houses. Moreover, the circular organization of the high-rises allowed for a central
open space, which was organized around a number of registered structures—an old
mosque, a dysfunctional bath and four adjacent traditional houses. TOKI officials argued
that the variety in building types increased costs and demanded them to fit into simpler
plan types to be produced via modular tunnel mold systems. The contract was nullified
after the designer’s decline to make concessions regarding architectural quality.
A new architectural office produced three successive proposals, each of which contained
a higher number of units per instructions from TOKI (interview with the architect,
03.12.2016) (Fig. 4). The increase in the built area also brought about changes in the sizes
of the units which meant alterations in already signed contracts between TOKI and the
residents. The residents were outraged to learn that their houses were increased in size,
which meant that their debt to TOKI was multiplied without their consent. The displeasure
was further increased with the failure to finish construction on time and the disorganization
in the payment of promised rent aid. Here a number of points are worth emphasis since
they reveal the problems of the process. First, the contracts were signed individually and
demolitions started in 2007. However, the final project was not achieved until April 2008.
Interestingly, even the 2009 report of the Chamber of City Planners Bursa Branch, pre-
pared in March, included the visuals of the initial project (2009: 63–65), that is, by early
2009, neither professional organizations nor the residents were informed about the changes
in the project. Second, the execution of the project was done in stages each of which was
pursued by a different firm. Since the detailed projects were not achieved at the time of the
bids, it was up to the subcontractors to have the detailed projects prepared. This, in return,
gave them chance to manipulate the architects toward reducing costs, which is often the
case in TOKI’s renewal projects (Gür and Dostoğlu 2010).
2009 was an election year, in which the ruling AKP—controlling the central govern-
ment as well as the district and metropolitan municipalities under discussion—used the
project for propaganda. The mayor of Osmangazi Municipality ran for the greater
municipality and won the post. However, after the elections the discontent of the share-
holders grew. Soon they began to mobilize using social media and questioning the details
of the project, which proved to be different than the initial one. In addition, the latitude
8 The fact that Bursa Commodity Exchange had a share in the project was only revealed once the orga-
nization waived its share later in the process.
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given to the subcontractors resulted in low-quality materials and poor finishing. These
problems only became visible after some of the residents managed to sneak into the
construction site and uploaded photographs from the buildings under construction in early
2010 (tokidoganbey.com 25.01.2010). The residents’ vocal protests led to lawsuits and
petitions to which TOKI chose not to respond. However, once the structural frame con-
struction was finished, both the misfit of the high-rises in the city’s skyline and the lack of
open space in the final organization were revealed.
The failures of the project can be summarized under a number of headings. First of all,
the shareholders had economic complaints due to the three-year delay in construction
Fig. 3 Initial urban design proposal (Source: Nalbant 2011)
Fig. 4 Site plan of the final version (Source: Nalbant 2011)
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process as well as the involuntary increases in floor areas of the apartments which meant
unplanned increase in mortgage payments. Secondly, the social environment was wors-
ened: The neighborhood relations significantly diminished within the high-rise blocks, and
the residents complained about the misfit between the apartments and their daily activities.
A recent field research has revealed that the social discontent in the housing compound is
so high that it has generated negative psychological effects on individuals (Gür and
Dostoğlu 2016: 98). Although it is not possible to directly relate them with negative
environmental quality, it is worth mentioning here that there have been two cases of
suicide attempts in the high-rises (Bursaport 09.07.2012; Bursadabugün 22.03.2016).
Thirdly, the residents complain about architecture: They criticize the blocks for their
excessive height and closeness as well as their negative effect on the city silhouette (Gür
and Dostoğlu 2016: 102). The low quality of construction is frequently voiced by the
residents, and the constricted open spaces in between the towering high-rises do not
generate social interaction. Perhaps, the most interesting observation is the complaint of
the residents regarding the lack of safety in the housing compound with its central location
in the city. According to research findings, the residents refrain from using the underground
parking lots for fear of security and request walls to enclose the compound (Gür and
Dostoğlu 2016: 104). While the residents are not happy with the quality of life in the
compound, it is also not possible to say that the area is well connected to the historical
center. The renewal of the area brought about traffic congestion by creating easy access to
the center which previously was blocked due to narrow streets of the organic texture.
Nevertheless, the area neither conforms to the commercial activities of its surrounding nor
does it provide an impetus strong enough to transform its character.
In addition to the stakeholders’ complaints, professional organizations criticized TOKI
and the municipality for the shady process and took the matter to court. The Bursa branch
of the Chamber of Architects organized a photography competition entitled ‘‘TOKI’s Slap
in the Face of Bursa’’, criticizing the project (Chamber of Architects Bursa Branch 2011).
The opposition parties blamed the government for the failure. The government in return
pointed at TOKI as the responsible organization. According to TOKI officials, the changes
in the project were inevitable and due to the unforeseen composition of the shareholders
(interview with the head of TOKI’s urban renewal department, 12.11.2015). TOKI
Director Ergün Turan claimed that it was the failure of the architects who could not
produce quality design and that there were no talented architects in Turkey (haberler.com,
29.03.2015). The public pressure on the government became even more serious toward
2011, in which the general elections were to take place. This time, the organized stake-
holders utilized the upcoming elections as a leverage to gain concessions. With directives
of the Prime Minister, TOKI canceled 30% of the overall debt; meanwhile, the district
municipality renounced its share of 35 units, and the Bursa Commodity Exchange also
gave up 1/3 of its share. These negotiations helped ease the shareholders’ outrage and
allowed the AKP to maintain its vote rates in 2011 elections. Nevertheless, the damage to
the urban tissue and its social and economic environment prevailed (Fig. 5).
2 Urban design as a tool/remedy for a holistic approach
The empowerment of TOKI represented a particular strategy of urban development in
Turkey, where the government eagerly supported the expansion of construction activity.
Legislation changes promoting real estate and construction investments followed one
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another after 2004. These changes aimed at the deregulation of the legal and institutional
framework of urban planning and existing bureaucratic control mechanisms over devel-
opment (Balaban 2012). The outcome was increased autonomy for developers in private
sector as well as TOKI itself, which from then on acted as a profit-oriented actor (Özdemir
2011; Batuman 2013). Land-use plans were revised and/or renewed to encourage market-
driven redevelopment. Here, urban design was deployed as an instrument to achieve
piecemeal projects, to which the plans were later adapted. As we have pointed out above,
the stages of the renewal process in Doğanbey reveal the role defined for urban design
within TOKI’s renewal mechanism. Here, it is reduced to the physical expression
(massing) of the economic model and developed without any deliberation with other
stakeholders. Contrary to its current practice in Turkey, we argue that urban design can and
should serve as a key instrument to develop a holistic approach to the process of urban
regeneration, which, rather than prioritizing profit, should be understood as a compre-
hensive action in the face of urban decline (Roberts and Sykes 2000).
Urban design has assumed an increasingly dominant role in place-making parallel to the
global commodification of urban space (Hubbard 1996; Carmona et al. 2002; Madanipour
Fig. 5 Current view from the site (Source: Authors)
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2006). Cities competing for investments are turning to urban design as a major instrument
(Gospodini 2002). Within this context, the quality of urban space emerges as an important
concern. Here, quality simultaneously signifies two different aspects which do not nec-
essarily conform to each other: livable environments and user-friendly spaces, and suit-
able conditions for investments requiring disciplining of labor. This dual aspect brings into
question the ideological character of urban design (Gunder 2011). The question here is
whether or not urban design can reconcile the social and economic interests.
Madanipour (2006) has analyzed the reasons of the increasing importance of urban
design in the last decade and stated that when the state becomes a regulatory institution,
urban design becomes a more private action dealing with larger-scale investments as a part
of economic rationales. Carmona et al. (2002) have also emphasized the regulatory role of
the public sector in providing incentives and setting barriers in the process. Coordinating
urban development, reducing uncertainties and risks with a better allocation of resources in
the city and securing the value of property are main roles of urban design. This brings us to
the question why TOKI (a central state institution) is involved in the production of new
settlements, if not for regulating the development of such areas. It is understandable that
short-term business cycles put a pressure on city-building to make it faster and to increase
the exchange value. In such cases, the state is expected to control the quality of the process
and the product to increase the use value.
Urban design as an integral part of the urban development process requires the building
of a coalition among various actors to arrive at a consensus on the new city image, which
consists of a blend of the past, present and the future (Hubbard 1996). A well-designed
environment is positively evaluated by all parties, including developers, investors and
occupiers: ‘‘the rationales for each stakeholder’s views on the value of the design (which
determines how much they are prepared to invest in it) are mediated by the nature of the
system of interaction among those stakeholders, determined by the planning system,
market regulations, and so forth’’ (Carmona et al. 2002, p. 149).9 Participative approaches
have often resulted in sustainable environments achieved through democratic decision-
making processes.
Childs (2010, p. 15) claims that ‘‘urban fellows’’ are one of the main components in
such debates and ‘‘collaborative networks of urban fellows may include: (1) place-based
networks, (2) professional networks and (3) governmental networks’’. Although all these
parties took part in the renewal of Doğanbey, the result is not satisfactory for any of the
parties precisely because a participation mechanism was not defined.10 A crucial point that
differentiates Doğanbey case from other TOKI projects is that the area was not a peripheral
squatter settlement but an inner city area with splintered ownership, which had two major
consequences. The first is the relative height of the rent gap in the renewal area, and the
second is the lower-middle-class character of the shareholders which makes them inclined
to display an entrepreneurial subjectivity discussed earlier. While the squatters living in
areas subject to regeneration are individually more vulnerable due to their limited legal
rights on land, they display varying levels of solidarity in defending their living envi-
ronments—their only possession in the urban realm. Doğanbey residents, in contrast, were
not desperately attached to their environment and saw opportunities of economic gain in
9 Here, it is worth mentioning that there are counter arguments as well. For instance, Raco and Imrie (2000)
have argued that ‘‘technologies of government’’ as a set of mechanisms, regulate and monitor actions of all
the actors in the local development process toward the expected end by the government. Thus, ‘‘active
citizen’’ and policy-making communities turn out to be another tool of government rationality.
10 TOKI organized an event in 2011 to assess its errors in urban regeneration. See TOKI (2011d).
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the project. Nevertheless, lack of participation in the process became a serious problem for
TOKI with this kind of stakeholder profile when discontent with the enforced increases in
mortgage payments began to gain an organized character threatening the upcoming elec-
tion results. Hence, TOKI had to use the only means available, which was to raise the rent
to allocate some portion of it to the stakeholders by increasing the built floor area. Thus,
the lack of participation which generally is beneficial to TOKI and the municipalities in
controlling the residents in a designated renewal zone has counterworked in the case of
Doğanbey, leading to a populist form of negotiation.
We strongly believe that urban design is a key instrument to define terms of partici-
pation and it should be a vital part of such large-scale projects, especially when they have
an impact on the urban context. It is certain that the benefits from exchange value would
increase with a better urban design and this is the selling point of more esthetic and
sustainable developments. Yet, in Doğanbey, the treatment of stakeholders as atomized
actors rather than a collective agent has led to their identifying with single apartments
instead of perceiving the total environment of the housing project. Here, we arrive at the
problem of architecture, or the quality of the built environment. Although TOKI’s housing
estates are generally criticized for their lack of concern for the context, none has been so
disastrous as Doğanbey.11 Moreover, TOKI’s revenue-sharing projects in luxury housing
are all marketed with an emphasis on architectural elegance. Apparently, know-how and
competent designers are not what the process lacks.
A new urban image, even if it contradicts with local heritage, might be a source of civic
pride and solidarity if it is embraced by citizen groups. Innovative design may boost both
exchange and use values of new urban spaces. Madanipour (2016) defines this as exper-
imental urban design, which helps promoting and branding the city. In Doğanbey case,
symbolic value, collective memory, identity and pride are ignored together with archi-
tectural identity. This is particularly significant for the AKP in power, since the party
identifies itself with the Ottoman past as a representation of a nationalist image defined
primarily by Islam (Batuman 2016).
In Doğanbey, the failure to identify the housing compound as a living environment for
residents and the focus on individual apartments as commodity has led to the overlooking
of the economic surplus that could have generated with a better design. As Gunder (2011,
p. 191) has rhetorically asked, ‘‘How could someone not want to live in a beautiful place of
efficient urban form that provides a high standard of livability? Indeed, this should be a
universal planning goal… But, and this is a big BUT, beauty, form, and livability must not
be blindly produced by practitioners at an inequitable cost to other residents or exploited
labor, or, especially, at the cost of environmental degradation.’’ Thus, an optimization of
components including beauty, user comfort and satisfaction is required, where urban
design may serve to mutual benefit rather than irreconcilable opposition between exchange
and use values.
3 Conclusion
In this article, we analyzed the mechanisms and processes of building a non-space with a
drastic case asking questions on interested parties, lacking tools and communication gaps
between various actors. In Doğanbey case, neither public nor private benefits are satisfied
as far as the citizens buying and living in the houses are concerned. Particularly in Bursa,
11 See, for example, the cases presented in TOKI (2011c).
838 B. Batuman, F. Erkip
123
TOKI settlement creates a problem for city branding and sustainability issues, indicating
that even the neoliberal policies are overridden by the investors, developers and public
authorities. ‘‘Responsive cohesion,’’ as applied by Radford (2010) to urban design deci-
sions, seems one good and timely suggestion for future urban design processes. To set
ethical foundations and boundaries of urban design practices, it needs to be beneficial for
all parties involved. Bursa’s identity is damaged tremendously by the misfit between TOKI
Doğanbey and the overall context. Seemingly, the dominating factor in urban design
practice of Turkey is economic benefit and it constitutes the foundation of related deci-
sions. Yet, the Bursa case illustrates the loss of economic rationale due to lack of com-
munication and accountability, which led to a failure to establish long-term power
coalitions.
It is crucial to note the difference between construction in a vacant lot and a dense tissue
in the urban core of a historic city such as Bursa. In the first case, architecture may enhance
or restrict the life of the inhabitants only, whereas in the latter it is also a stain in the urban
context. Thus, a successful urban design is crucial along a successful architecture. We
might consider the settlement partly a public space due to its central location, both for its
inhabitants and other citizens either passing through or viewing it from a distance. This
issue of publicness is very much related to esthetical values and needs to be discussed from
an urban design viewpoint. Thus, we think that the effect of the built environment—an
edifice or a settlement—in the city is threefold: its collective use as a public good, its
façade and physical features as an esthetic component of the city and its economic impact
on the inhabitants and citizens. This understanding necessitates a thorough analysis of the
context, in terms of economic and social relations and space characteristics before and after
the production process.
TOKI as a state institution should claim responsibility for the end product in all respects
including esthetic and environmental issues, utilizing urban design as a strong ally in the
process. Controlling the process and creating harmony between all interested parties can
only be provided by a public institution. As illustrated by our discussion on Doğanbey,
Bursa, urban design practice in Turkey is not holistic and requires redefinition. This
situation may be seen as an opportunity to make a fresh start for building a more effective
discipline, which is inspired by recent debates on urban design. Assuming that this is the
intention, a paradigm change in urban planning and design in Turkey is required; ‘‘a
culture shift’’ is needed to make urban design ‘‘a long-term concern for governing
authorities and property developers’’ (White 2015, p. 345). As suggested by Loukaitou-
Sideris (2012, p. 476), ‘‘expanding urban design’s scope and perspective’’ to involve
everyday life of all citizens should be one of the first steps.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on how to deal with the disastrous environment created in
the center of Bursa. Doğanbey compound can be used as a living laboratory for the purpose
of creating a place from a non-place, since failed attempts at urban renewal in Turkey are
not limited to this case. The site should be analyzed by a group of expert urban designers in
collaboration with local planning bodies with respect to esthetic concerns and urban
identity components. Feedback from shareholders and interested citizen groups should also
be taken into consideration this time. Afterward, local and central government authorities
might decide on the cost of intervention by urban designers to make the settlement a viable
and appealing environment for users and citizens. Public funds by TOKI should be used to
transform this non-space into a living laboratory to set a good example for the future
developments in other cities.
The analysis of the process in Doğanbey leads us to the following strategies to prevent
future failures:
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• Making urban design a part of planning process through laws and effective control
mechanisms is needed at the macro-level. TOKI seems to be the appropriate public
institution to provide this service instead of realizing the construction process. It should
work as an intermediary between investors and the public rather than functioning as a
private actor as was the case in Doğanbey. Urban design directed by a powerful public
institution guarantees attention to public benefit.
• In Doğanbey case, urban design efforts were ignored for financial reasons. Yet,
promoting urban design as a selling point for investors and developers may help see
urban design as a necessary component. Thus, urban design can also serve economic
interests emphasizing the value of the produced environment as a whole rather than the
single apartments as commodity.
• Urban design can also provide a framework for participation on levels of decision
making as well as design. Defining the development phases with feasible and short-
term benefits for developers and investors, and informing the public about long-term
benefits help create a positive attitude toward the project from all parties. Informing all
actors on a regular basis with participatory methods reduces the potential of conflict
that has created a lot of problems in Doğanbey case.
• Participation can also be extended to the stage of physical design, where participatory
urban design further encourages identification with the housing environment as
residents.
• Increasing accountability and transparency which were missing in Doğanbey renewal
process should also be taken into consideration as a function of public authority.
These suggestions do not necessarily work separately and hierarchically; considering
them as the components of a holistic planning and design is more effective and applicable.
Creating and utilizing mechanisms of such a system, however, is far harder and time-
consuming.12 However, this is necessary in order to implement urban design in specific
cultural and institutional contexts.
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lendirme. In Cumhuriyet Döneminde Bursa’da Kentleşme Sempozyumu 22–23 Eylül Bildiriler Kitabı
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